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INTRODUCTION
After five years of intense negotiations, a group of over 130
countries adopted the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety' to the
Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD") to address safety is-
sues involved in the transboundary movement of living modi-
fied organisms ("LMOs") resulting from modern biotechnology. 2
Biotechnology includes a broad scope of agricultural, industrial,
and medical technologies that are used to create new products,
referred to as Genetically Engineered Products, from LMOs. 3
While biotechnology can be credited for biological advances,
such as better crop durability without the use of pesticides, the
field of biotechnology has outpaced the study of the environ-
mental impacts of such "advances."
Although the Biosafety Protocol recognizes that, "trade and
environmental agreements should be mutually supportive...,,4
the protocol raises serious international trade issues. Con-
1 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Report of the
Resumed Session of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties for
the Adoption of the Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:
24-28 January 2000, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN No. 137, at 1 (Jan. 31, 2000).
Note that the authors use the terms "Biosafety Protocol" and "Protocol" inter-
changeably throughout this article to refer to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
2 See <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/PROTOCOL/PROTOCOL.html>. See
also United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, at pmbl. (entered into force De-
cember 29, 1993) [hereinafter CBD].
3 LMOs are used to produce agricultural or pharmaceutical products that
have been genetically altered to produce plants that are more resistant to insects,
viruses or bruises, or that can better grow in certain areas or climates.
4 See Protocol, supra note 2, at pmbl, para.9.
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cerned with the uncertainty of the environmental and health
impacts regarding the use of LMOs, some governments fear
that the importation of LMOs into their countries will place
their citizens and their environments at risk. To protect
against such unknown and undesired consequences, these coun-
tries, throughout the Biosafety Protocol negotiations, have ar-
gued for the ability to refuse the importation of LMOs. Major
exporters of LMOs, however, contend that refusing such im-
ports would violate their long-standing trade rights as members
of the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
As discussed in this Article, neither treaty law nor interna-
tional trade case law clearly determines whether such trade re-
strictions under the Biosafety Protocol violate WTO principles.
In fact, the interplay between the Biosafety Protocol and WTO
is just one of many similar international debates between trade
interests and environmental concerns. Although cases decided
by the WTO hearing panel seem to indicate a bias in favor of
trade issues, this Article concludes that trade measures con-
tained in the Biosafety Protocol are compatible with WTO
principles.
Section I of the Article discusses the background of the Bi-
osafety Protocol and the WTO. This section describes the crea-
tion and evolution of each Agreement, which is important in
appreciating the areas of contention between them. Section II
analyzes whether the WTO will hinder the enforceability of
trade restrictions under the Biosafety Protocol. This section
first examines the issue of treaty supremacy under the Vienna
Convention. 5 The Vienna Convention principles do not apply to
international agreements if they contain a clause, such as the
"savings clause" contained in the Biosafety Protocol, which
specifies its relationship to other international agreements.
Moreover, the Vienna Convention does not address rules of con-
duct pertaining to non-Parties, unless the principles in a treaty
rise to the level of customary law, in which case the treaty binds
non-parties. Therefore, the presence of the "savings clause" in
the Biosafety Protocol, coupled with the fact that some WTO
members are not Parties to the CBD, confirm that the Vienna
5 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force January 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
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Convention principles do not solve the WTO and Biosafety Pro-
tocol dilemma.
Since treaty law under the Vienna Convention does not
solve the WTO and Biosafety Protocol dilemma, Section II also
analyzes existing international trade case law and how the deci-
sions may impact the relationship between the WTO and the
Biosafety Protocol. The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") Panel's approach to deciding similar issues,
such as the tuna/dolphin issue and the shrimp/turtle dispute, in
particular, provide a legal basis from which to derive insight for
the potential relationship between the WTO and the Biosafety
Protocol.
Section III explores various solutions to the WTO and Bi-
osafety Protocol dilemma and the overall trade and environ-
ment debate. Based upon recent international trade case law,
this section also illustrates how the Biosafety Protocol aligns
with WTO principles. The conclusion that the Biosafety Proto-
col and the WTO can coexist is reached through a comparative
analysis of the language in the Biosafety Protocol to the recent
decisions in similar international trade cases. Section IV pro-
vides recommendations for ensuring compatibility between the
Biosafety Protocol and the WTO.
I. BACKGROUND
Before addressing the areas of contention between the Bi-
osafety Protocol and the WTO, it is important to understand the
evolution of the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO. This section
will briefly describe the creation and purpose of the Biosafety
Protocol and the WTO.
A. Biosafety Protocol
The United Nations' (U.N.) Framework CBD was estab-
lished in 1993 with the following objective: "the conservation of
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and
the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the
utilization of genetic resources."6 The CBD calls for Parties to
consider the "need for and modalities of a protocol, including
advance informed agreement ("AIA") in particular, to ensure
6 CBD, supra note 2, at art. 1.
[Vol. 12:107
2000] THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL AND THE WTO 111
the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms
derived from modern biotechnology that may have an adverse
effect on biological diversity and its components." 7 In response
to this mandate, the Parties to the CBD established a legally
binding Biosafety Protocol to address the risks of trade in LMOs
developed through the use of modern biotechnology.
Negotiations to establish a Biosafety Protocol began in
1996 with the first meeting of the Biosafety Working Group
("BSWG"). In 1999, the BSWG completed a draft text of the Bi-
osafety Protocol and submitted it to the CBD Parties at an ex-
traordinary meeting of the Conference of the Parties ("ExCOP")
for possible adoption.8 The ExCOP consisted of the Miami
Group of agricultural exporting countries, the "Like-Minded
Group" of developing countries and the European Union
("EU").9 Despite long hours of negotiations, the three groups
failed to reach an agreement on the proposal. 10
7 See Draft Report of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference of Parties
for the Adoption of the Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1st ext.
mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/L.2/Rev.1 (1999) [hereinafter Proposed
Protocol].
8 See id. at para. 43.
9 See id. at para. 43-44; see also id. at Art. IV.
10 See id. at annex 2-4. The Miami group supports limiting regulation of
LMOs to only LMOs intended for direct release to the environment; minimizing
impacts upon trade with non-parties; eliminating Parties' right to refuse import of
LMOs in the absence of full scientific certainty that there will be no potential ad-
verse effects on the environment; limiting financial responsibility of exporters for
risk assessments; ensuring confidentiality; and fully protecting WTO protections
by deleting the "Savings Clause" in the draft of the proposed Protocol.
The Like-Minded Group, made up of China and the "Group of 77" developing
countries not included in the Miami Group, favor including commodities in the AIA
procedure, and including even those LMOs that are unlikely to adversely impact
biodiversity, also taking into account risks to human health. Among other things,
the Like-Minded Group also wants to include products derived from LMOs in the
Protocol, make risk assessment less science-based, and make the obligations apply
evenly between Parties without any opt-out provisions with regard to trade with
Parties and non-Parties by entering into other agreements, including those that
permit the application of domestic regulations to LMO imports that may be incon-
sistent with the provisions of the Protocol.
The European Union maintained a fairly neutral position; however, it favored
the possibility of allowing AIA to pertain to commodities, rather than just LMOs;
eliminating the right of importing countries to refuse imports in the absence of full
scientific discovery; certain requirements relating to trade with non-Parties and
replacing certain qualifications of Protocol rights and obligations to free trade with
non-binding language.
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The failure to reach a consensus centered on two major ar-
eas of contention. First, significant differences persisted re-
garding whether the Biosafety Protocol should subject
commodities intended for food, feed, or processing to its AIA
procedures, which would require exporting countries to provide
prior notice to importing countries regarding the intentional
transboundary movement of all LMOs covered under the Bi-
osafety Protocol. 1 ' Such "prior informed consent" ("PIC") provi-
sions are not uncommon to treaties. 12 Based upon certain risk
assessments, PIC provisions allow an importing country to pro-
hibit such import, request additional relevant information re-
garding the import, or approve the import without conditions.
13
Second, governments disagreed to certain provisions, such
as the "savings clause," which would allow the WTO rights and
obligations to supercede those of the Biosafety Protocol. Oppo-
nents to the Biosafety Protocol (most notably, the United
States) favor the use of "trade protective" provisions and argue
that the use of trade sanctions (commonly referred to as
"sticks") to ensure compliance with the Biosafety Protocol are
unenforceable because they go beyond the permitted trade regu-
lations of the WTO Agreements and hinder trade. 1 WTO policy
strongly favors incentives such as financial or technical assis-
tance (commonly referred to as "carrots"), over "sticks," to en-
courage compliance with multinational environmental
agreements ("MEAs"). Some supporters of the Protocol, how-
ever, argue that the use of "carrots" is an insufficient method to
promote such environmental compliance. Countries that are
acting in compliance with the environmental standards are
placed at a distinct competitive disadvantage to those countries
11 See Protocol arts. 7, 10.
12 See, e.g., United Nations Environment Programme Conference of Plenipo-
tentiaries on The Global Convention on The Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes: Final Act and Text of Basel Convention, 28 I.L.M. 649, 664,
at art. 6 (entered into force May 5, 1992) (shipments of hazardous wastes cannot be
exported without prior informed consent of importing country). See also The Le-
gally Binding Instrument for the Application of the Prior Informed Consent Proce-
dure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade,
(visited March 5, 2000) <http://irptc.unep.ch/pic/> (PIC Treaty requiring prior con-
sent and agreement of importing countries regarding exports of certain chemicals
and pesticides).
13 See CBD, supra note 2, at arts. 8,12.
14 See id at 63.
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that refuse to comply, and are all but without a viable means of
redress.
The Biosafety Protocol addressed each of these areas of con-
tention. First, the Biosafety Protocol distinguishes between
products derived from LMOs that are intended to be introduced
into the environment (such as seeds, fish, and microorganisms)
for AIA purposes, and similar products intended to be used as
food, feed, or processing. 15 Products intended to be introduced
into the environment are subject to an AIA procedure, which
requires exporters to seek consent from importers before the
first shipment of products derived from LMOs. 16 If an import-
ing country determines there is insufficient evidence that the
product is safe based on a scientific risk assessment, it may ban
the import of such product.1 7
Bulk shipments of LMOs that are intended to be used as
food, feed, or for processing (referred to as "commodities") are
not subject to the AIA procedure; however, the Biosafety Proto-
col requires proper labeling and documentation of these prod-
ucts indicting that the shipment "may contain" living modified
organisms and are "not intended for intentional introduction
into the environment."18 Over the next two years, however,
negotiators are to develop more specific labeling requirements.
This provision came as a compromise between the Miami
group, that favored softer labeling requirements, and the Like-
Minded group, that would have required labels giving specific
details of what LMOs were in exported products. 19 The U.S.
argued that requiring specific labels would entail identification
of different strains of LMOs which would cost the grain indus-
try billions of dollars.20 Without such labeling, however, a
country would not be on notice that its imports contain poten-
tially hazardous materials.
In addition to the AIA procedures, the Biosafety Protocol
also establishes an Internet-based Biosafety Clearinghouse
where governments will post results of their domestic findings
15 See Protocol, supra note 2, arts 7,11.
16 See id. at art. 7.
17 See id at art. 10.
18 See id. at art. 18 para.4.
19 See Global Deal Agreed on GM Food, January 31, 2000 (visited Feb 2000)
<http://www.bioindustry.org/newsnet/current/3.htm>.
20 See id.
PACE INT'L L. REV.
regarding biosafety and exchange scientific, environmental,
technical, and legal information about products derived from
LMOs. 21 Final decisions on domestic use of LMOS must be dis-
tributed to the Clearinghouse within fifteen days of a govern-
ment's decision on use. 22 The Biosafety Protocol assists
developing countries in building their capacity for managing
modern biotechnology.
Second, the Biosafety Protocol chose to preserve the eco-
nomic interest of the Parties by the inclusion of the "savings
clause." The clause simply provides that the Biosafety Protocol
does not alter, but fully preserves, the rights and obligations of
governments under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
other international agreements. 23 This provision arises from
the inherent differences in environmental agreements and
trade agreements. Environmental agreements typically rely on
the Precautionary Principle, which does not require full scien-
tific certainty that a product will cause serious harm before
such product can be prohibited or restricted, while trade agree-
ments require a degree of scientific evidence to restrict the use
or trade of potentially dangerous products. Thus, in preserving
existing international agreements, the Biosafety Protocol favors
economic interests of the Parties over the Precautionary
Approach.
B. World Trade Organization
The GATT 1947 was formed after World War II to promote
world peace through equitable and efficient world trade. By
nurturing international relations through the development of
trade efficiency, the Parties sought to eliminate a major source
of conflict between countries. 24 During the negotiation stage of
the CBD and before the creation of the WTO, the GATT 1947
21 See Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 20.
22 See id. art. 11, para.1.
23 See id. at preamble.
24 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT]. After the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the GATT
organization became the World Trade Organization [WTO] on January 1, 1995.
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. For purposes of this
Article, all references to GATT 1947 and GATT 1994 as established in the Final
Act are recognized as GATT 1994.
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was undergoing amendment. The amendments resulted in the
GATT 1994, which incorporated GATT 1947 principles. 25
Most notable among these GATT principles is the prohibi-
tion of protectionist activities by domestic industry such as the
imposition of bans, quotas and licenses on imported and ex-
ported products. 26 Another important GATT 1947 principle, the
"Most Favored Nation" ("MFN") obligation, also was incorpo-
rated. Designation as an MFN prevents nations from discrimi-
nating between "like products" of other Member States. 27 Also
of significance in this analysis is a retained GATT 1947 section
that allows for certain exceptions to the prohibition on the use
of trade sanctions. 28
The WTO came into existence in 1995 and now consists of
over 130 members, accounting for over 90% of trade world-
wide.29 The main objective of the WTO is to help trade "flow
smoothly, freely, fairly, and predictably."30 The WTO encom-
passes the rules of GATT 1947, the Uruguay Round Protocol,
including its annexes, and the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade. 31 The WTO also incorporates GATT 1947 provisions
that apply to issues not covered by the Uruguay Round, includ-
ing trade-related issues such as technical barriers to trade, san-
itary and phytosanitary measures, and agriculture. 32
Despite its primary trade mission, the WTO recognizes the
need for environmental considerations. This approach is re-
flected in the preamble of the WTO, which states:
Recognizing that [the Member States'] relations in the field of
trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large
and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand,
25 See GATT 1994, supra note 24.
26 Id. at art. 3.
27 Id. at art. 1. It is important to note that the language compares only prod-
ucts, not the processes or methods of production of the products.
28 Id. at art. 20.
29 See World Trade Organization Home Page (visited June 16, 1999) <http:fl
www.wto.org/wto/inbrief/inbr02.htm>.
30 Id.
31 See GATT 1994, supra note 24, at art. 16 (Members of the WTO "shall be
guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the Con-
tracting Parties to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of
GATT 1947.").
32 See Final Act, supra note 24.
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and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services,
while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in ac-
cordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development
.... 33 (emphasis added)
In accordance with its preamble, the WTO's Trade Negotia-
tions Committee established the WTO's Committee on Trade
and Environment ("CTE").34 The CTE was established in 1994
as a result of the Uruguay Round on trade negotiations. 35 The
CTE replaced and continued the work of the GATT's 1947
Working Group on Environmental Measures and International
Trade and was charged with a concise ten-point work plan.36
Most notably, the work plan included a charge to study the rela-
tionship between the provisions of the multilateral trading sys-
tem and the trade measures for environmental purposes,
including those pursuant to MEAs.37
Notwithstanding its environmentally promising preambu-
lar language and the establishment and charge of the CTE, the
WTO remains under attack for ignoring environmental con-
cerns in favor of free trade.38 One commentator has argued
that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body focuses on "whether en-
vironmental laws are trade-friendly, not whether one member's
laws are appropriate for the environment."39 If this perception
truly reflects the attitude of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,
33 The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994 WL
761480 (Apr. 15, 1994).
34 Trade Negotiations Committee, Decision on Trade and Environment,
MTN.TNC/W/141 (Mar. 29, 1994).
35 IISDnet Trade and Sustainable Development, The WTO Committee on
Trade and Environment (CTE) (visited June 22, 1999) <http://iisd.ca/trade/wto/cte.
htm> [hereinafter IISDnet].
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 DANIEL C. EsTy, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE Fu-
TURE 53 (1994) (noting that the WTO's "substantive rules, which predate the emer-
gence of the environment as a critical issue, are too narrowly focused on the
commercial benefits of trade facilitation and must be updated to reflect environ-
mental considerations.").
39 Julie B. Master, Note, International Trade Trumps Domestic Environmen-
tal Protection: Dolphins and Sea Turtles are "Sacrificed on the Altar of Free
Trade." 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 423. 431 (1998).
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environmental issues will not be given priority over trade con-
cerns, regardless of the gravity of harm to the environment.
This article, however, will examine the shift in the WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Body from its alleged anti-environment posi-
tion towards one that is more environmentally conscious.
II. THE PROBLEM: WILL THE WTO IMPEDE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL?
The Biosafety Protocol contains provisions that could im-
pede rights that members of the WTO currently enjoy. Now
that the Parties have agreed to a Biosafety Protocol, they will be
forced to determine which Agreement prevails. In making this
determination, countries must first examine existing treaty
law. If treaty law does not answer the issue in question, coun-
tries must next consider similar trade and environment case
law. Unfortunately, in this situation, neither treaty law nor
case law provides a clear resolution as to which Agreement
prevails.
A. Conflicts Between Agreements: Which One Prevails?
While the principles of the WTO have matured into a well-
established body of law, the issue of "treaty supremacy" or
"treaty accordance" is intensifying in the trade and environ-
ment debate as the number of MEAs grows. The Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties provides that when conflicts
arise between two treaties concerning the same subject matter
and between countries that are a party to both of the conflicting
agreements, the latest treaty will prevail.40 The Vienna rule,
however, contains two limitations. First, it does not apply if a
treaty contains a clause specifying its relationship to other in-
ternational agreements. Secondly, it offers no rules of conduct
pertaining to non-Parties to either one of the treaties at issue.
1. Savings Clause
Regarding the first limitation of the Vienna rule, the pre-
amble to the Biosafety Protocol contains a provision, known as
the "savings clause," similar to that of Article 22 of the CBD, 41
40 See Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 59.
41 See Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 31.
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which emphasizes that the Biosafety Protocol will not impact
the rights and obligations of a party under any existing interna-
tional agreements.42 This preambular language, however, is
not identical to the savings clause found in the CBD, which pro-
vides " [t]he provisions of this Convention shall not affect the
rights and obligations of any Contracting Party deriving from
any existing international agreement, except where the exercise
of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or
threat to biological diversity."43 Taken together, the savings
clauses contained in the Biosafety Protocol and the CBD raise
the issue of whether GEPs pose serious damage or a threat to
biological diversity so as to allow the Biosafety Protocol to take
precedence over existing trade agreements. Hence, the issue
arises as to whether GEPs pose a serious damage or threat to
biological diversity, so as to allow the Protocol to take prece-
dence over existing trade agreements.
When considering biotechnology, one must weigh the pros-
pect of massive benefits to society from the use of LMOs against
the reservations associated with the use of such products. Res-
ervations arise due to the vast uncertainties regarding environ-
mental and health implications caused by the often untested
and ever-expanding range of LMOs.
The Biosafety Protocol will regulate LMOs likely to have
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of bio-
logical diversity. During the negotiations, most countries
agreed that items such as seeds, plants, animals and other ma-
terial able to transfer or replicate genetic material could poten-
tially have an adverse effect on the conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity.44 Ultimately, the parties agreed
to subject only LMOs for intentional introduction into the envi-
ronment to the AA procedure. 45 This provision does not in-
clude LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed, or for
processing.46 Such commodities, however, must be accompa-
nied by documentation stating that shipments "may contain"
42 Id. at art.7, para.1.
43 See id. at pmbl. para. 10; see also CBD, supra note 2, at art. 22.
44 See Proposed Protocol, supra note 6, at para. 12.
45 See id. at art. 7, para. 2.
46 The contention, however, arose over whether agricultural commodities such
as oils, sugars, and animal feed derived from GEPs also should be included with
these requirements. Industrialized countries argued that scientific evidence does
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LMOS and are "not intended for intentional introduction into
the environment."47
Importing countries argue that there is a lack of scientific
certainty regarding the safety of most LMOs, especially those
products able to replicate genetic material. In fact, herbicide
tolerance and insect resistance of plants are among the most
common genetically engineered traits; therefore, it seems that
most LMOs are prone to replicate genetic material.48 A recent
report on risk assessment of genetically engineered plants
found that, "[a] reasonable risk assessment for long-life and ge-
netically heterogeneous plants (e.g., forest trees) seems impossi-
ble .. .(and) [i]n agriculture .. .long-term impacts can hardly
be assessed."49
Given that there are various examples of types of LMOs,
and multiple risks associated with each, a general list of the
potential dangers from LMOs is helpful.50 The following is a
listing of potential risks:
* New toxins and allergens in foods;
* Other damaging effects on health caused by unnatural
foods;
" Increased use of chemicals on crops, resulting in increased
contamination of food and water supply;
not support the contention that commodities derived from LMOs threaten bi-
odiversity, and therefore should not be regulated under the Biosafety Protocol.
47 See id. at art. 18, para. 2(a).
48 Mae-Wan Ho and Ricarda A. Steinbrecher, Fatal Flaws in Food Safety As-
sessment: Critique of the Joint FAO / WHO Biotechnology and Food Safety Report
(visited on June 14, 1999) <http://.southside.org.sglsouthltwnLtitle/fao-cn.htm>.
49 H. Torgersen, Ecological Impacts of Traditional Crop Plants - A Basis for
the Assessment of Transgenic Plants? (visited on June 7, 1999) <wysiwyg://25/
http://www.ubavie.gv.at/publikationen/mono/m75s.htm>.
50 A study on insect-proof potatoes found "significant differences in levels of
protein, starch, sugar, and other enzymes. The study further found that rats that
fed off of the potatoes developed impaired development in the intestine, pancreas,
kidneys, liver, lungs and brain; an enlarged thymus; and a depressed immune re-
sponse with evidence of intestinal infection. Jill Davies, So Why All the Fuss Over
GE Foods? (visited on June 7, 1999) <http://www.purefood.org/ge/jilldavies.cfm>.
Another example of such risk is the well-known bovine growth hormone
(rBGH), which is associated with "high incidence of udder infections, internal
bleeding, stress-related weight loss and severe reproductive disorders in cows. Ad-
ditionally, "pigs altered to produce human growth hormone for leaner meat have
underdeveloped muscles and often cannot stand up." Brian Tokar, Fact Sheet on
Genetically Engineered Foods & Crops, (visited on June 7, 1999) <http://www.
purefood.org/ge/geFactSheet.htm>.
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" The creation of herbicide-resistant weeds ("Superweeds");
" The spread of diseases across species barriers;
" Loss of biodiversity in crops;
" The disturbance of ecological balance;
" The artificially induced characteristics and inevitable im-
perfections will be passed on to all subsequent generations
and to other related and unrelated organisms; and
" Genetically engineered food can never be recalled or
contained. 51
Based on this long list of potential risks and the vast
amount of uncertainty in biosafety, it is likely that the exercise
of WTO rights and obligations would cause serious damage, or
at least a threat, to biological diversity. For this reason alone,
the provisions of the CBD, as well as the Biosafety Protocol,
could prevail according to the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Similarly, according to general principles of international
law, when dealing with treaties on the same subject, the treaty
that is more specific governs matters under its domain, while
the more general treaty governs the broader scope at issue.
Usually, MEAs are more subject-specific. Thus, when dealing
with a trade dispute between two Parties to an MEA, the rules
of the MEA would likely govern.
Therefore, although the savings clause in the Biosafety
Protocol preserves the rights and obligations of the Parties
under prior Agreements, the exception to the savings clause
contained in the CBD, which reads, "except where the exercise
of those rights and obligations would cause serious damage or
threat to biological diversity," also could apply. Although there
is an overlap between the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO
rights, the focus is on Biosafety. Since the Biosafety Protocol
and the CBD speak more specifically to this issue than the
WTO Agreement under the Vienna Convention Principles, the
Biosafety Protocol and the CBD would most likely govern.
51 The impacts of these risks are incalculable. See Lifeforce, Genetically Engi-
neered Food, A Serious Health Risk, (visited on June 7, 1999) <http://www.vegan
village.co.uk/veganvillage/newstand/life.htm>. See also Topics of Concern Related
to the Environmental Release of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) (visited
June 15, 1999) <http://www.icgeb.trieste.it/biosafety/bsfconc.htm>.
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2. Non-Parties
The second deficiency of the applicability of the Vienna
Convention is the issue of non-Parties, specifically the United
States, in the Biosafety Protocol negotiations. Although the
non-Party dilemma is generally associated with MEAs, the non-
Party issue in the Biosafety Protocol centers on the United
States' involvement in the Biosafety Protocol. Currently, the
United States is not one of the 175 governments who are Par-
ties to the CBD.5 2 Despite its non-Party status to the CBD, the
United States was active in the Biosafety negotiations, advocat-
ing that the Biosafety Protocol should not impact WTO rights
and obligations. 53
While the United States has a rather strict set of environ-
mental standards and biosafety regulations, other countries
may not have the capacity to develop or enforce such regula-
tions. 54 If domestic law alone were applied, those countries
with inadequate or nonexistent biosafety regulations would be
defenseless against the importation of products beyond their
borders, especially LMOs that are able to reproduce. Therefore,
uniform trade restrictions or guidelines for developing and de-
veloped countries are necessary to ensure proper regulation of
LMOs and the adequate protection of biodiversity in all
countries.
Under Article 24 of the Biosafety Protocol, Parties are al-
lowed to trade in LMOs with non-Parties only in a manner con-
sistent with the objectives of the Biosafety Protocol.5 5 The
52 See CBD, supra note 2. The U.S. has signed the Agreement; however, for-
mal ratification awaits in the Senate. See Biotechnology: U.N. Experts Meeting
Recommends Pact on Genetically Modified Organisms, BNA INT'L ENv'T DAILY, 8/1/
95 IED d2. The U.S. is part of the Miami Group, which consists of Argentina,
Australia, Canada, Chile, the United States and Uruguay. These six major agri-
cultural exporting countries contend that sufficient guidelines and regulations al-
ready exist under other international agreements, and that the imposition of a
Biosafety Protocol will only cause economic inefficiencies and financial loss to
agribusiness companies. See Paul E. Hagen & John B. Weiner, The Proposed Bi-
osafety Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity (April 15-16, 1999) (un-
published manuscript cosponsored by the Environmental Law Institute with the
cooperation of the ABA Section of International Law and Practice) at 19.
53 See Protocol, supra note 2, para. 2 allowing non-Parties to participate as
observers in the proceedings of the Biosafety Protocol.
54 See United States, Regulatory Oversight in Biotechnology (visited on June
15, 1999) <http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech/OECD/usregs.htm>.
55 See Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 24.
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vague language in Article 24, however, is subject to various in-
terpretations. A broad interpretation could be quite trouble-
some for importing countries, especially considering that the
same Article also recommends that Parties to the Biosafety Pro-
tocol conduct trade with non-Parties while only encouraging
non-Parties to conform to the Biosafety Protocol. Thus, it is
possible to envision a country expanding its interpretation to
allow trade with a non-Party who otherwise would be excluded
from such trade.
Additionally, without trade sanctions, an importing coun-
try, especially a developing one, probably cannot encourage a
developed country like the United States to adhere to the Proto-
col. Aside from trade sanctions, importing countries possess
few, if any, levers to enforce the provisions of the Protocol.
Alternatively, Article 24, interpreted narrowly, could re-
quire non-Parties to adhere strictly to the specific provisions of
the Protocol. As importing countries welcome the protections
this interpretation offers, other countries, like the United
States, fear that non-Party provisions could restrict trade in
covered LMOs that are currently protected under existing WTO
rights and obligations.
In response to such fears, the United States and other
members of the Miami Group demanded that the savings clause
be included in the Biosafety Protocol. Generally, this provision
allows trade concerns to take priority in the event of a conflict
between the WTO rules and the Biosafety Protocol. 56 Non-gov-
ernmental organizations also have expressed similar
interests .57
56 See Protocol, supra note 2, at pmbl.
57 Some United States industry groups also view the Biosafety Protocol as a
restriction on their ability to export genetically modified products to other coun-
tries. In a letter to the United States Trade Ambassador, Charlene Barshefsky,
several United States business and agricultural organizations expressed their con-
cerns with the draft text of the Protocol. The letter listed the following "problems"
with the draft Protocol:
" Import bans and/or significant non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in some countries
would effectively block trade in biotech products . . . that do not have an
adverse impact on biodiversity.
" The inclusion of non-scientific based criteria in assessment and/or risk man-
agement procedures, such as socio-economic considerations.
* Onerous labeling or documentation requirements for seeds . . . and con-
sumer goods could result in product production method discrimination ....
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Despite the European Union's attempts during the negotia-
tions to ensure that the Biosafety Protocol would not be over-
shadowed by other international agreements, ultimately, "[t]he
trade interests of just six countries (total population around 500
million) [have] blocked a protocol that would have provided a
basis for the safe transfer, handling and use of LMOs in coun-
tries around the world (6,500 million consumers). s58 This is sig-
nificant because it illustrates that any MEA having a negative
economic impact on trade could be challenged by those coun-
tries negatively affected, especially the United States, under
the auspices of the WTO. 59 If the conflict between the WTO
rules and MEAs are not clarified, the MEAs could become virtu-
ally meaningless if they, in any way, affect trade.
On the biosafety issue, the United States favors free trade
over environmental concerns. The United States contends that
the implementation of the GATT 1994 exceptions to allow envi-
* The legitimization of decision-making regimes based on non-scientific prin-
ciples will undermine progress made within . . . the WTO and lead to a
patchwork of diverse regulatory regimes and to increasing uncertainty in
trade.
" Restrictions on trade with non-parties, such as the United States, could ef-
fectively decrease competitiveness of U.S. exports vis- . . . -vis its competi-
tors that are Parties to the CBD.
USCIB Letter to the USTR Ambassador Regarding the Biosafety Protocol in a let-
ter dated Dec. 2, 1998 (visited on June 14, 1999) <http://www.uscib.org/policy/
barfin.htm>.
John Fitzgerald, head of the Western Ancient Forest Campaign, indicated that
the issue of biodiversity must be addressed in terms of guidelines dealing with the
regulation of trade in genetically modified organisms; however, he warned that a
"full-fledged protocol' may not be the answer. Fitzgerald suggested that Parties
should instead consider developing biological criteria with certain testing proce-
dures and other guidelines in place to ensure protection of the ecosystem against
potential problems of some GMOs. Richard D. Godown, senior vice president of
the Biotechnology Industrial Organization, reaffirmed Fitzgerald's position and
claimed that the Protocol would "kill any prospects of U.S. ratification" of the CBD
and that, "while GATT is trying to open up trade, this would restrict it." Helena
Paul, Biosafety Talks Break Down Without Agreement as U.S. and Other Grain
Exporters Block Progress (visited on June 18, 1999) http://www.oneworld.org/news/
reports/lmo.html>.
58 See id.
59 U.S. Delegate, Rafe Pomerance illustrated this concern in his remarks re-
garding the Biosafety negotiations, "[wie were too important, too big, and too
thoughtful to be ignored... we are pleased that everyone in the end agreed that it
would be inappropriate to move forward without a consensus." Biotechnology:
Talks on Biosafety Pact Suspended; U.S.-Led Group Blocks Compromise Accord,
BNA Int'l Env't Daily, 2/6/1999 IED d2.
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ronmental trade measures ("ETMs"), based upon process and
production measures ("PPMs") to protect health or life, will im-
pede its WTO rights. In the cases discussed in Section II, how-
ever, the United States argued that exceptions under Article XX
should include extra-jurisdictional protections concerning
PPMs used in the production of certain products, irrespective of
the WTO rights of other Parties. Therefore, it is possible, if not
likely, that without clear and uniform guidelines indicating
which international agreement obligations trump the other, a
country merely will commit to whichever agreement favors its
position based on the given issue, rather than in accordance
with a uniform principle or procedure.
B. International Case Law Addressing Trade and
Environment Disputes
As evidenced in the Vienna Convention analysis, interna-
tional treaty law does not always provide clear solutions for
problems involving two or more conflicting international agree-
ments. Given the lack of guidance in international treaty law,
countries must look to international trade case law for an un-
derstanding of whether the Biosafety Protocol and WTO can co-
exist. Unfortunately, the lack of international coordination in
the formulation of international trade law and international en-
vironmental law has contributed to a mounting tension between
trade interests and environmental concerns creating the so-
called trade and environment debate. 60
Given the similarity of issues raised in the Biosafety Proto-
col and the standard arguments presented in the trade and en-
vironment debate, it is important to have a general
understanding of not only the Biosafety Protocol, but also the
long-standing contentions between trade objectives and envi-
ronmental concerns. The debate usually involves a country or
group of countries asserting that free trade endangers the envi-
ronment, while other countries assert that environmental pro-
60 One environmental organization attributed the problem to the "complex
structure of international environmental management, involving a large number
of regimes at many different levels of governance." Six Easy Pieces: Five Things
the WTO Should Do - and One it Should Not (last modified May 27, 1999) <http://
iisd.ca>.
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tection endangers free trade.61 Similarly, some countries claim
that "sticks" should serve as a device to promote environmental
protection, while other countries assert that "carrots," rather
than penalties, would better advance compliance with environ-
mental standards.
Most multilateral environmental agreements, including the
Biosafety Protocol, use both the "carrot" and the "stick" ap-
proaches. For instance, to ensure compliance with the MEAs,
developed countries may offer financial or technical assistance,
or both, ("carrots") to developing countries so that developing
countries can comply with the environmental standards. To
avoid "free riders," however, some countries also have found it
necessary, in their efforts to preserve and protect the environ-
ment, to impose ETMs on other countries that enjoy the bene-
fits derived from the financial sacrifices of others.
Usually, ETMs exist in the form of product standards, tar-
iffs, taxes, restrictions on imports and exports, or sanctions and
are used to influence environmental policy in other countries.
62
This article will discuss how the GATT panel has found the use
of unilateral ETMs, as opposed to multilateral ETMs, to be con-
tradictory to the goals of the WTO. Principle 12 of the Rio Dec-
laration states that "[u]nilateral actions to deal with
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the import-
ing country should be avoided."63 WTO members have acted in
accordance with Principle 12, expressing their condemnation of
unilateral trade measures used to pursue environmental objec-
tives outside the jurisdiction of a Member state.64 Thus, argu-
ments supporting unilateral trade measures have proven
fruitless in disputes before the GATT Panel. 65
61 For an overview of the trade and environment debate, see generally DAVID
HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY 393 (Treaty
Supp. 1998).
62 Michael Edward Foster, Note, Trade and Environment: Making Room for
Environmental Trade Measures Within the GATT, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 393 (1998).
63 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 874, 878 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
64 Report of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/1
(Nov. 8, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 CTE Report].
65 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §402 (1987) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT]. Customary international law allows for extraterritorial regu-
lation when the subject of the regulation is aimed at an activity that has a
"substantial effect" on the regulating state. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult
2000]
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Multilateral ETMs, on the other hand, are arguably more
WTO-compatible because they reflect international consensus,
usually in the form of an MEA. In the GATT Panel's Tuna/
Dolphin I and II and Shrimp/Turtle decisions, the Panel indi-
cated its uneasiness with unilateral sanctions and its willing-
ness to consider multilateral ETMs for this reason.66 Although
there is evidence that the use of ETMs pursuant to an MEA,
such as the Biosafety Protocol, will "survive GATT 1994 scru-
tiny," the legality of such trade measures under GATT remains
unsettled.67
Another issue regarding ETMs often will arise when a
country refuses imports from an exporting country based upon
the exporting country's method of production. The exporting
countries argue that such practices are unilateral trade mea-
sures, imposed solely to force them to change their domestic pol-
icy in order to reestablish trade ties with the importing country.
While GATT 1994 prohibits discrimination among "like prod-
ucts," the GATT definition does not determine the likeness of
products according to the methods by which they are pro-
duced. 68 Thus, the sirens of "state sovereignty" begin to sound
when trade sanctions are imposed on any "like product" based
upon the manner in which it is obtained or produced.
to determine what constitutes a "substantial effect" when balancing the negative
effect on the regulating country with the impact on the regulated country. Tradi-
tionally, customary law requires consistent State practice and the existence of
opinio juris (legal obligation). See generally The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900) (stating that where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legis-
lative act or judicial decision, courts must resort to the customs of nations); The
North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3,12 (1969) (discussing customary
international law).
66 See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on hnports
of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (Aug. 16, 1991) [hereinafter Tuna I]; GATT Dispute Panel
Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (May 20,
1994) [hereinafter Tuna II]; WTO Report of the Panel Concerning the United
States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, available at
1998 WL 256632 (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter WTO Shrimp Panel Report]; WTO
Report of the Appellate Body Concerning the United States Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (98-0000) (Oct. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report].
67 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65. "When account is taken of the limited
numbers of MEAs that contain trade provisions, and the fact that no trade dispute
has arisen over the use of those measures to date ... there is no evidence of a real
conflict between the WTO and MEAs." 1996 CTE Report, supra note 64, at para. 6.
68 GATT 1994, supra note 24, at art. 3.
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Alternatively, while noting the importance of guarding
against protectionist abuse, proponents of environmental trade
measures based on PPMs argue that a determination of "like
products" must be based upon PPMs. Market-based incentives
can thus be employed to pressure industry into practicing envi-
ronmentally responsible production and consumption. 69 MEAs
usually focus on the impacts of a product's production, use, and
disposal on the environment, rather than the use of the product
itself.70
Furthermore, many MEAs adopt the precautionary ap-
proach to avoid potential harm and increased costs associated
with correcting the damage, as opposed to the lower cost of pre-
ventative measures. 71 By entering into MEAs, importing coun-
tries argue that they should have the ability to compel
sustainable production practices, especially if they are prohib-
ited from rejecting imported products that were produced in an
environmentally degrading fashion. Despite the environmental
arguments to the contrary, "sticks," whether or not mixed with
"carrots," are most often prohibited by the WTO. This prohibi-
tion restricts MEA parties' ability to ensure compliance with en-
vironmental measures. Thus, nations, including those that
freely enter into MEAs like the CBD, may be prohibited from
enforcing ETMs as a means of enforcing compliance. The prohi-
bition of ETMs ("sticks") is a critical issue because it strips the
MEA Parties of one of only a few devices used to promote envi-
ronmental compliance. Without this tool, Parties may be una-
ble to ensure compliance and ultimately, the environments of
all countries will suffer.
Recently, several situations, similar to the biosafety issue,
have arisen requiring the interpretation of certain provisions of
the GATT 1994 and its relationship to MEAs. While interna-
69 Six Easy Pieces: Five Things the WTO Should Do - And One it Should Not,
supra note 60.
70 The Biosafety Protocol covers LMOs that are destined for direct entry into
the environment such as corn and soy. Some countries, however, argue that the
Protocol also should cover products derived from LMOs such as pharmaceuticals,
textiles and processed foods. Therefore, if the Protocol is extended to cover prod-
ucts derived from LMOs, the Biosafety Protocol, as an MEA, would ratify the ap-
plicability of PPMs in determining the imposition of environmental trade
measures upon a country. See generally Protocol, supra note 2 passim.
71 See Rio Declaration, supra note 63.
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tional case law does not establish binding precedent, it is never-
theless persuasive authority. Thus, it is important to evaluate
existing international environmental law principles and com-
pare the earlier decisions and opinions of the GATT Panel re-
garding trade and environment issues in order to adequately
analyze the impact of the GATT-WTO framework on the Bio-
safety Protocol.
To date, the GATT Panel has decided several major trade
and environment cases. 72 The major issue in each of the cases
was whether the imposed trade measures were allowed under
the exceptions found in Article XX of the GATT 1994, which pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjusti-
fiable discrimination between countries where the same condi-
tions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adop-
tion or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;...
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restric-
tions on domestic production or consumption. 73
Also at issue in each of these cases were U.S. attempts to im-
pose trade sanctions on other countries based upon PPMs. In
other words, the actual products (i.e., tuna or shrimp) were not
at issue. Rather, at issue were the methods by which the prod-
ucts were obtained and the detriment such methods caused to
other environmental resources. Regardless of the adverse envi-
ronmental implications involved in each case, trade issues
trumped environmental concerns each time.
Considering that PPM-based trade sanctions were rejected
in prior case law, one might also presume the failure of such
measures based on PPMs under the Biosafety Protocol. Despite
the uncertain forecast of the Biosafety Protocol's power, lan-
guage in the GATT panels' opinions suggests a possible shift by
72 See, e.g., supra note 66 (listing various reports).
73 GATT 1994, supra note 24, at art. 20 (emphasis added). This introductory
language is referred to as the "chapeau."
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the GATT Panel towards a more balanced approach between
trade and environment issues.
1. Tuna/Dolphin Cases: Interpreting GATT 1994,
Article XX(b)
The Tuna/Dolphin dispute ("Tuna I") arose in 1990, when
the United States placed an embargo on tuna imports from
Mexico pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act
("MMPA"). 74  The GATT Panel ("Panel") decided that the
United States could not impose trade-restrictive measures
against Mexico to protect dolphins killed by certain tuna fishing
practices because the killings occurred outside of the United
States.75 Moreover, even if Article XX(b) were interpreted to in-
clude extra-jurisdictional protection of life and health, the
Panel concluded that the United States had failed to meet the
"necessary" element of the exception because it had not ex-
hausted all GATT-consistent options reasonably available to it
at the time. 76 Article XII of GATT 1994 merely states that par-
ties are obligated to attempt to settle any trade disputes
through consultation and negotiation.77 Although the Panel did
not offer any "less GATT-inconsistent" alternatives, previous
decisions of the Panel may assist in explaining the rationale be-
hind the Tuna I decision.
74 16 U.S.C. §1361-1421h (1994) [hereinafter MMPA]. The embargo derived
from an amendment to the MMPA that provided for trade restrictions against any
nation that killed dolphins at rates above those of the U.S. tuna fleet. See gener-
ally id.
75 See Tuna I, supra note 66 passim.
76 See id. The exhaustion of all GATT-consistent options available was re-
quired of a party applying for the GATT 1994 exception. See generally id.
77 GATT 1994, supra note 24, at art. 12. Article 12 states:
(1) [e] ach contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and
shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such repre-
sentations as may be made by another contracting party with respect to
any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement. (2) The contracting
parties may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any con-
tracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been
possible to find a satisfactory solution though consultation under para-
graph 1.
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In the Cigarette Panel Report, the Panel interpreted the
term "necessary" to mean that no alternative measure exists.78
The Panel noted that when a measure consistent with other
GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting
party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available
to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with
other GATT 1994 provisions. '79 In the Cigarette Panel Report,
the Panel denied Article XX(b) exceptions because the objectives
sought through import restrictions could have been achieved
through internal regulations affecting domestic sales.80
In Tuna I, the United States did not satisfy the internal
regulation requirement of the Panel's test. Therefore, the Tuna
I Panel ultimately held that "the United States had not demon-
strated. . . that it had exhausted all options reasonably availa-
ble to it to pursue its dolphin protection objectives . . . in
particular through the negotiation of international cooperative
arrangements."8 1
After the Tuna I decision came the Tuna/Dolphin II dispute
of 1994 ("Tuna II").82 This time, the EU challenged the United
States' ban on tuna imports to one of the EU's intermediate
countries as a result of the MMPA. In another attempt to pro-
tect the dolphins, the United States argued that the ban was
"necessary" under the Article XX(b). Although the decisions of
the WTO dispute settlement system have no precedential value,
the Panel nevertheless relied on its prior decision in Tuna I.
The Tuna II Panel employed a three-step process in inter-
preting Article XX(b). The Panel addressed three key issues:
(1) Whether the substance of the policy of the measure in question
was the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health; (2)
78 Report of the Panel on Thailand-Restrictions on importation of and inter-
nal taxes on cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) 200, at para. 74
(1990), reprinted in GATT: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on Thai Restrictions
on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991) [herein-
after Cigarette Panel Report].
. 79 Report of the Panel on United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) 345, at para. 5.26 (1990) (last visited
Mar. 5, 2000) <http://wto.org/dispute/panel.htm> (emphasis added).
80 See Cigarette Panel Report, supra note 79 passim. Thailand argued that its
import ban on cigarettes was "necessary" to protect human health, but the Panel
concluded that domestic regulation was less inconsistent with GATT. See id.
81 Tuna I, supra note 66, at para. 5.28.
82 See Tuna II, supra note 66.
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whether the measure for which the exception is being invoked
was necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health;
and (3) whether the measure had been applied consistently with
the chapeau, avoiding arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
and/or a disguised restriction on trade."83
While the first issue was a given, the Panel decided that
the trade measures used to force other countries into compli-
ance did not satisfy the other two elements of Article XX(b).
The second issue failed because the Panel again employed a
"least trade restrictive" interpretation of "necessary."8 4
The Panel claimed to apply the ordinary meaning of "neces-
sary." The plain meaning of "necessary" is "needed" or "essen-
tial." Thus, as applied in Article XX(b), "nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement . . . of measures . . . [needed or essential] to protect
human, animal or plant life or health."8 5
Broadening the interpretation of "necessary" could allow
countries to use trade devices as levers in forcing other coun-
tries to change their domestic policies to align with the desires
of others. Although that is the purpose of ETMs, if conditions
are not clearly articulated as to when ETMs are allowed, coun-
tries dependent upon the trade of such regulated products
could, in effect, be forced to surrender their sovereignty to com-
ply with the domestic law of another country. If this were the
case, countries with ulterior motives could decide to impose
trade sanctions to gain economic advantage over the importing
country. Consequently, such bad faith unilateral sanctions defy
the purpose of the WTO to promote fair and nondiscriminatory
trade practices.
On the other hand, a narrow interpretation is also illustra-
tive of how the prohibition of such trade measures results in
weakened environmental compliance mechanisms. For in-
stance, if an importing country already has undertaken good
faith efforts to promote more sound environmental practices,
while an exporting country refuses to negotiate concerning such
83 See Tuna II, supra note 66.
84 See id. at para. 5.3. Recent Panel reports have required a measure to be
"among the measures reasonably available ... , that which entails the least degree
of inconsistency with the other GATT provisions." Id.
85 See GATT 1994, supra note 24, at art. XX (b).
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environmental standards, without the Panel offering any exam-
ples of "least trade restrictive" options for a country to apply, an
importing country remains defenseless against the infiltration
of products across its borders. Thus, it follows that trade sanc-
tions were included in GATT 1994 for just such a circum-
stance-when it is evident that a country is unwilling to work
towards achieving environmentally sound policy. If environ-
mental protection were not intended to override some of the
trade interests in such circumstances, environmental protection
language would not be written under the "Exceptions" title of
GATT 1994.
Given that the Panel held the trade measure was not "nec-
essary," the measure was viewed instead as arbitrary and un-
justifiable discrimination and a disguised restriction on trade
under the chapeau.8 6 Thus, the third element also was not met.
One WTO report noted that the purpose of the language in the
chapeau exists to ensure Article XX exceptions are not
abused.8 7 Thus, it seems clear that the framers also had the
same concerns, which would explain why such qualifying intro-
ductory language was incorporated in the Article. Thus, apply-
ing a "least trade restrictive test" to Article XX(b) is
unnecessary given the introductory language of the Article, (the
"chapeau") which prohibits "unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries" and "disguised restriction on international
trade."88
The language in the chapeau is written to prevent unilat-
eral sanctions intended to impose the policy of one country on
another. The language, however, leaves the door open to justifi-
able and non-prejudicial use of trade sanctions in MEAs and
other agreements where countries have joined to address envi-
ronmental concerns without violating the WTO. Such allow-
ance is consistent with the purpose of the WTO because the
cooperative action of countries in addressing environmental
threats reduces barriers to trade that could arise with various
86 GATT 1994, supra note 24, at art. 20.
87 See Tuna II, supra note 66, at 898 para. 5.39 (stating that restrictions on
the importation of tuna were not "necessary").
88 See WTO Appellate Body: Report of Appellate Body in United States-
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603 (May 20,
1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gas Report].
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domestic programs and possibly could bring forth more disputes
between countries.
Therefore, the "no other alternative" definition of "neces-
sary" is too narrow when read with the opening language. The
descriptions of "unjustifiable discrimination" and "disguised re-
striction on international trade" more adequately indicate the
intent of the framers as to when the exception may or may not
be applied. The language indicates that countries are to refrain
from imposing trade measures except when they are truly
needed to protect the environment. The sanctions, however,
must be employed fairly and in good faith. This approach would
address the two major concerns in the chapeau. First, "unjusti-
fiable discrimination" speaks to the underlying purpose of the
GATT-WTO regime, which is to promote fair trade practices.
Second, a "disguised restriction on international trade" ad-
dresses the concerns of countries fearing the possibility of forced
imposition of other countries' rules in order to preserve their
economies.
Moreover, if the Panel's interpretation were literally ap-
plied, the failure of the uncooperative countries to internalize
costs would reduce efficiency and cause harm to the environ-
ment. Even if countries choose not to adopt domestic policies to
internalize costs, they should not adopt policies that externalize
costs to other countries. This practice is both economically inef-
ficient and harms the environment by forcing countries to ac-
cept goods produced in a way that is harmful not only to the
country attempting to impose sanctions, but to the global com-
munity as well. Trade interests should not overshadow agree-
ments in which countries recognize the problem, and through
negotiations agree to include trade restrictions as levers within
multilateral agreements to correct, or at the very least, mitigate
potential environmental damage. If the agreements are ra-
tional, justifiable and non-prejudicial, they should fit within the
environmental exception of Article XX.
Thus, interpreting "necessary" to mean that trade mea-
sures may only be applied when there are no alternatives, re-
gardless of the effectiveness of such alternatives, is too narrow.
Trade measures should be applied so long as they are not dis-
criminatory and not imposed in bad faith with the intention of
restricting trade to gain economic advantage.
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2. Shrimp /Turtle Dispute: GATT 1994, Article XX(g)
On May 15, 1998, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
("DSB") ruled that a United States embargo of shrimp was in-
consistent with Article XI:I of GATT 1994 and could not be jus-
tified under Article XX of GATT 1994.89 The case began when
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand challenged a ban by
the United States on imports of shrimp harvested without the
use of turtle-excluder devices ("TEDs"). The use of TEDs was
mandatory under Section 609 of the Endangered Species Act of
1973. 90 According to the Panel, the United States' ban on
shrimp imports under Section 609 violated Article XI (as did the
ban on Tuna in the previous cases) because it imposed a "re-
striction other than duties, taxes, or other charge."91
Asian countries argued that the United States' trade re-
striction also violated Articles I and XIII of GATT 1994 because
it discriminated against "like products. '92 The Panel, however,
held that it was not necessary to address this alleged violation
because a violation already existed under Article XII. 93 The
United States in response argued that its trade restrictions on
shrimp fell under the Article XX exceptions of GATT 1994. The
Panel, however, rejected the United States' affirmative defense
and recommended that the United States limit its trade prac-
tices in accordance with its obligation under the WTO. 94
The United States appealed the Panel's ruling, arguing
that the Panel erred in finding that the trade restriction consti-
tuted unjustifiable discrimination. 95 Relying mainly on Article
XX(g), and in the alternative upon Article XX(b), the United
States contended that Section 609 fit within the exception be-
cause it strives to preserve a natural and endangered resource
(sea turtles).96 Further, the United States argued that Section
89 See WTO Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 66.
90 See WTO Rejects U.S. Appeal Over Shrimp Import Ban and Turtle Deaths,
(last visited Mar. 5, 2000) <http://www.nando.com/newsroom/ntn/health/101298/
health9_21468_noframes.htm>. The amendment requires foreign fishing vessels
to equip their shrimp nets with the $75 devices to prevent the deaths of 150,000
turtles a year.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 See Appellate Body Report, supra note 66.
96 See generally id. at pt. II.A.
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609 was an evenhanded measure that was justifiable and did
not constitute a disguised restriction on trade.
The Appellate Body (the "Body") seemed willing to accept
Section 609 in principle. The Body, however, stated that "a type
of measure adopted by a Member which, on its own, may appear
to have a relatively minor impact on the multilateral trading
system, may nonetheless raise a serious threat to that system if
similar measures are adopted by the same or other Members."
97
The Body relied on its decision in United States-Gasoline,
where it stated that it is "important to underscore that the pur-
pose and object of the introductory clauses of Article XX (the
"chapeau") is generally the prevention of 'abuse of the excep-
tions of [Article XX'. "98
The Body also indicated the sequential order of analysis in
determining the existence of an Article XX exception. First, the
measure must satisfy a particular provision, (a) to (j), under Ar-
ticle XX.99 Next, the measure must be analyzed in accordance
with the chapeau of Article XX.100
Interpreting GATT 1994, Article XX(g) is fairly straightfor-
ward. First, the measure must involve an "exhaustible natural
resource." 10 1 The Body found the term "natural resource" to be
"evolutionary... thus embracing both living and non-living re-
sources." 10 2 The Panel concluded the endangered sea turtles
obviously were exhaustible. Thus, the sea turtles are "exhaus-
tible natural resources."10 3
Next, the Body examined whether the measures sought "re-
late to the conservation of' the exhaustible natural resource
(sea turtles). 0 4 Section 609 imposed an embargo on shrimp
harvested without equipment necessary to preserve sea turtles.
Therefore, because Section 609 sought to protect the turtle
through means directly related to the ends, rather than through
a "blanket prohibition" of imports, the Body concluded that Sec-
97 Id. at pt. VI.A. (emphasis in original).
98 Id.
99 See generally id. at pt. VI.A.
100 See Appellate Body Report, supra note 66, at pt. VIA.
101 Id., at pt. VI.B.1.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at pt.VI.B.2.
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tion 609 is a measure "relating to" the conservation of an ex-
haustible natural resource within Article XX(g) of GATT 1994.
Finally, the Body examined whether the measures under
Section 609 were made effective in conjunction with restrictions
of domestic production or consumption. Since the United States
promulgated regulations in 1990 that now require all United
States shrimp trawlers to use TEDs, the Body also found that
Section 609 satisfied this requirement. As a result, the Appel-
late Body held that Section 609 satisfied the Article XX(g) ex-
ception because it was aimed at the conservation of an
"exhaustible natural resource" and was made effective in con-
junction with restrictions on U.S. production. Finding Article
XX(g) satisfied, the Appellate Body overruled the Panel's deci-
sion on that issue.
Noting the difficulty in applying the chapeau, however, the
Body reversed the Panel's analysis of the introductory lan-
guage. The Body further indicated that such an interpretation
of the chapeau would render the Article XX exceptions "inutile,
a result abhorrent to the principles of interpretation ...."105
Instead, the Appellate Body established another interpretation,
yet arrived at the same result.
The Appellate Body stated that the effect of the application
of Section 609 "is to establish a rigid and unbending standard
by which United States officials determine whether or not coun-
tries will be certified, thus granting or refusing other countries
the right to export .... 11lO6 Additionally, the Body indicated
that it had no evidence that the United States undertook nego-
tiations to discuss sea turtle conservation with the Asian coun-
tries before the imposition of the shrimp import ban. 10 7 As it
did in the Tuna/Dolphin cases, the United States had "jumped
the gun" and imposed trade sanctions before entering into suffi-
cient negotiations with its fellow WTO members. Therefore, the
Body held that the application of Section 609 constituted unjus-
tifiable discrimination. 10 8
Next, the Body indicated that Section 609 did not allow for
"minimum standards of transparency and procedural fairness
105 Appellate Body Report, supra note 66, at pt. VI.B.2.
106 Id. at pt. VI.C.
107 Id. at pt. VI.C.2.
108 Id.
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in the administration of trade regulations" as required under
Article X:3 of GATT 1994.109 Since Section 609 offered no for-
mal notice or reasons for denial of certification to allow imports,
nor did it allow for an appeal process, the Body held it to be both
arbitrary and discriminatory as well. 110
Despite the United States Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky's insistence that the law was applied consistently,
the WTO ruled that the restrictions were discriminatory under
Article XX of GATT 1994, and were an illegal attempt by the
United States to unilaterally impose its policies upon other
countries."' Given the Body's conclusion that Section 609 con-
stituted unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination, it decided it
was not necessary to examine whether Section 609 constituted
a disguised restriction on trade. 112 Consequently, even though
the U.S. embargo satisfied Article XX(g) of GATT 1994, it failed
to withstand the test found in the chapeau.
III. LESSONS LEARNED: SYNTHESIZING CASE LAW AND
THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL
The majority of existing recommendations concerning is-
sues raised in the cases discussed above are geared toward the
trade and environment debate in general. These recommenda-
tions focus on creating a "louder" and more persuasive voice for
environmental issues. The proposed alternative solutions con-
centrate on the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO, although les-
sons derived from the Biosafety Protocol experience likely will
continue to influence the trade and environment debate. 1
13
The alternatives proposed in this section suggest that pro-
gress has been made on the GATT Panel regarding environmen-
109 Id. at pt. VI.C.3.
110 See Appellate Body Report, supra note 66, at pt.VI.C.3.
111 See WTO Rejects U.S. Appeal Over Shrimp Import Ban and Turtle Deaths,
supra note 91.
112 Appellate Body Report, supra note 66, at pt. VI.C.3.
113 See Hagen & Weiner, supra note 52, at 21. "The Biosafety Protocol would
be the first multilateral agreement designed to regulate for environmental (and
possibly health protection) purposes trade that is likely to expand significantly
over time. As a result, these negotiations present the trade and environment de-
bate in a particularly stark light. How the international community ultimately
resolves the question of biosafety could shape the development of both interna-
tional environmental and trade law (and their relationships to one another) for
many years to come." Id.
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tal awareness. Concededly, there has not been as much
progress as environmentalists expect. However, when consider-
ing the overall approach of the Panel in its recent decisions, it
seems that the Panel is willing to consider environmental con-
cerns more seriously. The Panel favors the least restrictive type
of trade measures; however, it states that if trade measures are
imposed, it must be accomplished under a multilateral, rather
than unilateral, trade agreement. This approach limits a coun-
try's ability to abuse such trade measures, while still allowing
countries to enforce multilateral environmental agreements by
using trade measures as leverage devices.
A. Existing Recommendations to Resolve the Trade and
Environment Dispute
Various approaches have been suggested to resolve the
trade and environment debate. These approaches include the
"sticks only" approach, where countries punish polluters
through trade restrictions; the "carrots only" approach, where
countries offer polluters positive economic incentives; and a
mixture of "carrots and sticks" to protect the environment,
while not hindering free trade. 114 One scholar suggested:
One approach is to devise a clever mix of carrots and sticks from a
diverse enough issue garden to allow a cross-fertilization of con-
cerns. In between carrots and sticks are environmental products
and process standards applied equally to both domestic produc-
tion and imports. Such standards are not carrots because they
provide no additional benefit to foreign countries. Yet they are
not sticks either so long as such standards are applied to all coun-
tries in an evenhanded manner. 115
Examples of recommendations to resolve the trade and environ-
ment debate are addressed below. Each offers its own combina-
tion of "carrots" and "sticks."
Currently, the WTO has in place a Committee on Trade
and Environment (the "CTE").1 16 The WTO, with the help of
environmental experts, could work to strengthen the CTE. Al-
though this proposal is unlikely to harm the environmental ef-
114 See Master, supra note 39, at 426, 427.
115 EsTy, supra note 38, at 80. (discussing solutions to the trade and environ-
ment debate).
116 See generally IISDnet, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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fort, it is unlikely that environmental concerns would ever gain
equal ground so long as the CTE exists under the auspices of
the WTO. After all, the mission of the WTO remains trade ori-
ented, regardless of any committee it may choose to develop
under its umbrella.
Additionally, environmental experts could be allowed to sit
on GATT Panels dealing with trade and environment disputes.
This approach would eliminate the arguably one-sided ap-
proach of the GATT Panel and allow for more informed deci-
sion-making on environmental issues. Although the experts
can be extremely helpful in this regard, they should not be al-
lowed to serve as members of the Panel. The WTO remains a
"trade" organization and should remain focused on that pur-
pose. It is appropriate that environmental experts continue to
advise the GATT Panels on environmental issues that arise;
however, the WTO should not attempt to become a quasi-envi-
ronmental organization.
Another option, as one scholar has suggested, is to estab-
lish a "strong and comprehensive Global Environmental Organ-
ization (GEO)."117 Such an entity would aid in bridging the gap
between trade and environmental issues. Professor Daniel C.
Esty noted:
The world needs GAIT-like rules of mutual forbearance to protect
the environment and a supporting international body to manage
global environmental relations. The presence of global environ-
mental externalities, the public goods nature of environmental
programs, and the intergenerational tradeoffs inherent in envi-
ronmental policy choices necessitate an overarching regulatory
structure.
1 18
Esty suggests that this entity evolve as a counterpart to the
WTO.' 1 9 Esty further suggests that the GEO model structure
resemble that of the WTO.120 If the GEO is created with the
intent of possessing the requisite authority and influence, its
presence could serve as a catalyst and a voice for environmental
objectives.
117 EsTY, supra note 38, at 78-82, 85-86.
Is Id.
119 See id.
120 See id.
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Despite the potential benefits of a GEO, most government
officials and citizens are wary of more bureaucracy, whether do-
mestic or international. Convincing citizens that multiple and
separate environmental agreements are insufficient may be a
difficult task. Moreover, the conglomeration of various environ-
mental agreements, such as the separate trade agreements
under the WTO, are necessary under a GEO structure. This
also may prove to be a daunting task, especially if any of the
Parties dependent on such agreements fear a loss of protection
as provided for in the original agreements. Regardless of such
important concerns, a GEO can be "responsibly" established in
a way that would eliminate "bureaucratic waste" and instead
implement more efficient and effective environmental policy.
This entity would allow for more "clout" to negotiate with the
WTO and begin creating sound policy that benefits both trade
objectives and environmental concerns.
With respect to the Biosafety Protocol, the recommended
GEO could oversee activities relating to biosafety, including set-
ting incentives for collaborative efforts to regulate the transfer
of LMOs, establishing penalties for countries failing to cooper-
ate, serving as a hearing board to listen to the concerns of all
countries in the areas of both trade and the environment, and
mediating differences between the two sectors. Another obvious
and practical duty of the GEO would be to serve as a clearing-
house for all of the technological information concerning
biotechnology. 12 1
It also has been recommended that the GEO develop "envi-
ronmental indicators" to track and measure environmental poli-
cies.' 22 This measure would help establish consistency among
countries by eventually creating a set of "best practices" that
can serve as models for other countries. Models would not only
include the creation and testing of LMOs, but also would cover
importing practices and implementation procedures such as
risk assessment, effects on the environment (especially samples
of how certain products react in particular climates), and do-
121 See Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 20.
122 "A GEO could also serve as a focal point for work to improve scientific un-
derstanding of ecological problems, gather data on environmental trends, refine
analytic tools, and develop environmental 'indicators' to track the success of differ-
ent policies." EsTy, supra note 38, at 80.
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mestic regulations. The GEO could create a set of common reg-
ulations for the biotechnology industry, thus eliminating
unnecessary paperwork and allowing for more efficiency within
the industry, as some industry officials have advocated.
123
B. The Biosafety Protocol and the WTO Can Coexist
Considering the outcome of the Shrimp/Turtle and Tuna/
Dolphin decisions, environmental protection advocates may be
jaded towards the WTO. 124 However, if the decisions are closely
read, a trend towards environmental awareness and even a
willingness to allow for exceptions under Article XX is discerni-
ble. For instance, the Appellate Body decision in the Shrimp/
Turtle case discussed at length the importance of the preambu-
lar language of the WTO, which deals with environmental con-
cerns. It also listed the charges of the WTO's CTE.
The WTO should recognize the importance and effective-
ness of trade measures more fully than most other international
entities. Keeping in mind that the WTO exists to promote
trade, rather than hinder it, it is understandable that allowing
exceptions to the general WTO principles will be applied ex-
tremely conservatively. Moreover, considering that the overall
purpose of the WTO is to promote efficiency and fairness in
trade, together with the decisions of the GATT Panel, it is clear
that trade sanctions pursuant to MEAs are preferred over uni-
lateral actions. This preference allows for a "clever mix of car-
rots and sticks" by permitting trade sanctions, which were
123 Marlon Allen, Biodiversity: U.S. Industry Official Supports Biosafety Proto-
col to the U.N. Convention, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, 12/23/94 IED d2 quoting
Chester T. Dickerson Jr., director, agricultural affairs at Monsanto Company,
"[c]learly a biosafety protocol is needed; you just have to look to the United States.
Biotechnology in the United States is regulated by (the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, the Environmental Protection Agency,) and the Department of Agriculture
... ." See also id. quoting Jens Degett of Novo Nordisk (biotech firm with 50 per-
cent of the world's market for enzymes and insulin as of 1994), "it is better for our
work to have some rules to follow ... [and that the] rules are very strict, but it also
means that there is a great public perception of biotech ... and people believe in
the technology in general."
124 In response to the Shrimp/Turtle decision, several environmental groups
expressed their disapproval. The World Wildlife Fund announced, "[t]he WTO re-
mains an institution captured by the special interests of multinational corpora-
tions and free trade technocrats" and further indicated that the WTO was
ineffective in striking a balance between trade and environmental policies. WTO
Rejects U.S. Appeal Over Shrimp Import Ban and Turtle Deaths, supra note 91.
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agreed to by a group of countries, rather than merely allowing
one country to unilaterally "bully" another into changing its do-
mestic policies. Carrots still are available as levers to both indi-
vidual, as well as groups of, countries to employ before imposing
any trade measure.
On the surface, the recent GATT Panel decisions seemingly
may make dismal any hope of Panel approval of ETMs within
the Biosafety Protocol. The Biosafety Protocol, however, is dis-
tinguishable from each of the existing cases above. In fact,
trade sanctions to enforce the Biosafety Protocol are permissible
under GATT Panel decisions in the following key areas: (1)
scope; (2) chapeau language; and (3) GATT exceptions.
1. Scope: The Biosafety Protocol Does Not Violate WTO
Rights or Obligations
First, the Biosafety Protocol is compatible with the WTO
because it provides for MEAs, not unilateral trade measures.
The GATT Panel decisions have emphasized that MEAs are ac-
ceptable, whereas unilateral measures are not. Given that
countries freely enter into MEAs, it is illogical to deem them as
arbitrary, unjustifiable or protectionist as is prohibited under
the chapeau of Article XX. Thus, so long as the MEAs are freely
entered into and the same standards are applied both interna-
tionally as well as domestically, trade measures under MEAs
should be considered as "promulgated or brought into effect to-
gether with restrictions on domestic production or consumption
of natural resources." 125 This conclusion is consistent with the
requirements under Article XX(g). Therefore, because the Bi-
osafety Protocol is an MEA and contains built-in alternatives
such as labeling and information dissemination through a Bi-
osafety Clearinghouse, it should be able to overcome any chal-
lenge by any country claiming its WTO rights are impeded by
arbitrary, unjustifiable, or disguised restrictions on trade.
Second, the Biosafety Protocol does not violate WTO rights
because it covers everything related to biodiversity. A major
difference between the Biosafety Protocol and existing interna-
tional trade and environment case law is the amount of poten-
tial harm imposed upon humans, animals and plants if trade
125 GATT 1994, supra note 24, at art. XX(g).
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restrictions cannot be used to stop practices that cause such
damage. While the loss of one species such as dolphins or tur-
tles can be detrimental to the animals themselves, the ecosys-
tem, and the industries that thrive from their products, the
Biosafety Protocol deals with the biodiversity of the entire
planet. It covers an expansive range of products consumed by
humans and animals and inserted into plants and animals.
These products have the capability to reproduce and alter the
biodiversity of entire regions. Research in biotechnology, as in-
dicated earlier in the Article, is incomplete, largely due to the
inability to keep pace with the rapid development of biotechno-
logical innovation. Thus, the potential large-scale impact of any
unintended consequences is unfathomable.
Finally, the Biosafety Protocol is compatible with the WTO
because it does not discriminate between "like products." One
major distinction between these cases and the Biosafety Proto-
col is the issue of "like products." As in most other trade and
environment disputes, the issue of PPMs exists in the struggle
over the Biosafety Protocol. The issue of PPMs derives from the
MFN principle of GATT 1994, which provides for the equal
treatment of "like product[s] originating or destined for the ter-
ritories of all other contracting parties."126
Generally, trade agreements deal strictly with the end-
product. The phrase "like products" under GATT 1994 does not
distinguish between products based on how they are produced,
but only on the final product. Thus, goods produced in countries
with low or no environmental quality standards, which allow
them to produce at less expense, may gain a competitive advan-
tage over those countries that enforce higher environmental
standards. Not only does this practice place the environmen-
tally conscious country at an economic disadvantage, it also al-
lows environmentally harmful practices to persist. Case law
discussed above suggests a grim outlook for the GATT Panel to
consider PPMs in any future decisions. 127
The distinction in the biosafety dilemma, however, is that
the end-product arguably is not an identical or "like" product.
Rather, in the case of biosafety, most of the characteristics of
126 GATT 1994, supra note 24, at art. 1.
127 See generally supra pt. II.B, text and accompanying notes.
PACE INT'L L. REV.
the products are derivatives of the PPMs. 12s Thus, unlike the
previous cases, biotechnological products are not only produced
in a distinct manner but they create an entirely new product.
For example, genetically altered tomatoes contain elements
that do not exist in "normal" tomatoes such as genes derived
from animals, insects, fish or bacteria. However, whether a ge-
netically engineered tomato and a regular tomato are "like
products" remains questionable. Therefore, importing countries
could argue that they are no longer dealing with "like products,"
and that the prohibition on trade sanctions under GATT's MFN
provision should not apply. The concern of importing countries
is simple; while the end product may look the same, sometimes,
"it is what we don't see that will hurt us."129
2. The Biosafety Protocol Does Not Constitute an Arbitrary or
Unjustifiable Discrimination, Nor a Disguised
Restriction on Trade
The Biosafety Protocol does not allow for arbitrary or un-
justifiable discrimination under the GATT 1994, Article XX cha-
peau. According to the decisions and discussion surrounding
the Tuna/Dolphin cases and the Shrimp/Turtle Dispute, trade
measures imposed under the Biosafety Protocol are allowed
only after good faith efforts to negotiate are made.130 If such
measures are necessary, then they must extend to all Parties
and non-Parties trading with Parties to satisfy the introductory
language of Article XX. Sanctions also must be applied consist-
ently and fairly, so as to allow for transparency. According to
recent case law, if these tests are met, such sanctions under the
Biosafety Protocol would not constitute arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination between countries where the same condi-
128 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the En-
vironment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L. L. 268, 289
(1997) (discussing PPMs directly related to the characteristics of products such as
pesticides and growth hormones for cows are covered by the SPS and TBT Agree-
ments). See Final Act, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 24,
at art. 2.2 and annex 1, at para. 1 (TBT Agreement); Final Act, Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosantitary Measures, supra note 24, at 69 (SPS
Agreement).
129 Jackie Giuliano, Ph.D., Healing Our World, It's What We Don't See That
Will Hurt Us (visited Mar. 5, 2000) <http://ens.lycos.com/ens/feb99/1999L-02- 2 1g.
html>.
130 See generally supra Pt. II.B, text and accompanying notes.
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tions prevail. The Biosafety Protocol satisfies these tests for
three principal reasons.
First, the Biosafety Protocol applies evenly and fairly to all
parties and non-parties. The distinguishing factor of existing
international case law and the Biosafety Protocol is that, in
each case, the United States unilaterally imposed sanctions
based solely on its domestic law. No other countries joined the
United States in restricting imports as part of an MEA related
to the issues. Alternatively, the Biosafety Protocol contains pro-
visions as part of the MEA that allow for refusal of imports
under certain circumstances.13 1 Thus, each Party to the Bi-
osafety Protocol could enact domestic legislation and legally en-
force such trade restrictions according to the Biosafety Protocol.
Once the Biosafety Protocol enters into force, there is a
strong likelihood that some Parties to the Biosafety Protocol
will refuse to import some of the biotechnology products from
the United States. "While the signing of an MEA frequently is
considered to constitute a waiver of the signatories' GATT 1994
obligations/rights with respect to a particular MEA, it is not
clear whether a state can impose an ETM, even if it is author-
ized by an MEA, against non-signatories.' 3 2
Although the Biosafety Protocol allows Parties to enter into
separate agreements with Parties or non-Parties, such agree-
ments must be "consistent with the objectives of this Proto-
col."' 33 Agreements between Parties cannot "result in a lower
level of protection than that provided for by the Protocol."1 34
Thus, a Party cannot opt out of the Biosafety Protocol under a
separate and less-restrictive agreement with some countries,
while imposing tougher standards on others. Therefore, the
Protocol does not allow unjustifiable discrimination under
GATT 1994's Article XX Chapeau.
Second, the Biosafety Protocol does not provide for arbi-
trary discrimination. The Appellate Body in the Shrimp/Turtle
case emphasized the need for "transparency," or the ability for
countries to make certain that any agreement is being applied
131 See Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 10 (referring to the Decision Procedure).
132 Foster, supra note 62, at 393.
133 Proposed Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 24.
134 Id. at art. 14.
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in a "fair and just manner."135 Further, it noted that Article X:3
of GATT 1994 required such transparency. 136 There, however,
countries had no means of receiving notification of denial of cer-
tification, nor a rationale behind the denial. Moreover, such
countries were not granted a legal procedure for review or ap-
peal from a denial.
Unlike the Shrimp/Turtle case, the Biosafety Protocol,
through its AIA process, not only requires notification from the
exporting countries of certain LMO transactions, but also re-
quires "acknowledgement of receipt of notification" from the im-
porting country. 137  Moreover, the Biosafety Protocol
establishes a "decision procedure," which lays out a structure
for accepting or denying imports. 138 Once a decision is made, or
anytime thereafter, an importing country may change its deci-
sion "in light of new scientific information on potential adverse
effects on . . . biodiversity" and an exporting country may, at
any time, request that the importer review its prior decision.' 3 9
Also providing for transparency, the Biosafety Protocol re-
quires reporting of all "multilateral, bilateral and regional
agreements and arrangements" to a Biosafety Clearinghouse so
that other countries may become aware of such agreements. 140
Similarly, the Biosafety Protocol requires that Parties promote
"public awareness and participation."1 4' Thus, not only can
other countries obtain and review decisions, but any member of
the general public may do so as well. Therefore, given the nu-
merous and detailed provisions allowing for transparency and
legal review throughout the body of the Biosafety Protocol, it
does not constitute arbitrary discrimination of international
trade under GATT 1994's Article XX Chapeau.
In addition to not constituting arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination, the Biosafety Protocol does not provide for dis-
guised restrictions on trade. The Biosafety Protocol contains
language that protects against the possibility of protectionism
135 See Appellate Body Report, supra note 66.
136 See id,
137 See Protocol, supra note 2, at arts. 8-9.
138 Id. at art. 10.
139 Id. at art. 12.
140 Id. at art. 14, para. 2.
141 Id. at art 23. This includes making its decision-making process regarding
LMOs available to the public.
[Vol. 12:107
THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL AND THE WTO
by countries attempting to preserve their own economies. 142 Al-
though the Biosafety Protocol provides that "[any Party may
determine that its domestic regulations shall apply with respect
to specific imports to it," Parties cannot create "unnecessary ob-
stacles to international trade."143 Additionally, Parties to the
Biosafety Protocol also are required to notify the Biosafety
Clearinghouse of its decision not to import.14 4 Since the Bi-
osafety Clearinghouse will maintain this information, all addi-
tional agreements and restrictions (other than strictly protected
confidential material) will be available to Parties up front.145
Hence, a protective mechanism against any disguised re-
strictions on trade exists because all of the cards will be on the
table. Additionally, the clearinghouse will provide a forum for
countries to make their terms of trade known to all other coun-
tries. Thus, if other countries want to participate, they are
aware of the necessary criteria. As long as the country imposes
the same regulations upon itself, there should be no claims of
disguised restriction on trade.
Finally, in addition to the availability of information, im-
porting countries also must base their decisions of whether to
accept imports on certain risk assessments, as provided under
the Protocol, as well as notify the exporting country of the rea-
soning behind its decision.146 This measure also aids against
disguised restrictions on trade by preventing a country from im-
posing trade sanctions unchecked.
However, a protection for importing countries is built into
the Biosafety Protocol by allowing decisions to be made without
full scientific certainty or scientific consensus regarding the po-
tential adverse effects of LMOs. 147 Although some countries
142 See Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 14.
143 Id.
144 Id. at art. 10 para. 4. The Biosafety Clearinghouse would serve to
"[f]acilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental and legal informa-
tion on, and experience with, living modified organisms," while also assisting Par-
ties in implementing the Protocol.
145 See Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 21.
146 Id. at art. 15. See also id. at art. 10 para. 3 (providing that, "[w]ithin two
hundred and seventy days of the date of receipt of notification, the Party of import
shall communicate, in writing, to the notifier and to the Biosafety Clearinghouse
the decision." Also, except when consent is unconditional, such communication
must include the reason for the decision.).
147 See Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 10 para. 6.
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fear this provision will open the floodgates for countries to re-
fuse imports of LMOs without any scientific basis, such a provi-
sion is necessary. It is especially necessary in the area of
biosafety, where advances in biotechnology are outpacing the
guidelines necessary to regulate such products. Little time is
spared from development to test the effects of such products
before introducing new products into the environment.
In an attempt to further protect importing countries, the
Biosafety Protocol provides:
"[niothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as restricting the
right of a Party to take action that is more protective of the con-
servation and sustainable use of biological diversity than that
called for in this Protocol, provided that such action is consistent
with the objective and the provisions of this Protocol and is in ac-
cordance with its other obligations under international law."148
While seemingly allowing stricter domestic regulations on
LMOs, the final phrase in this provision limits countries from
taking any actions prohibited by the WTO. Although raising
separate issues, this provision also prevents discrimination and
disguised trade restrictions. Countries may apply stricter do-
mestic law, but it must be applied in a manner consistent with
the Protocol and the WTO, both of which require evenhanded-
ness and prohibit discriminatory and self-interested trade
practices.
3. The Biosafety Protocol Qualifies for GATT 1994,
Article XX Exceptions
According to existing case law, trade sanctions under the
Biosafety Protocol may satisfy the narrow interpretation of the
environmental exception under Article XX(b). The GATT
Panel, by not offering an explanation of what constitutes a
"least GATT-restrictive measure" and not addressing the effec-
tiveness factor of "reasonable alternative" in pursuing environ-
mental objectives, is making it difficult, if not impossible, to
predict the outcome of the status of ETMs within the Biosafety
Protocol. Without knowing what constitutes the "least-GATT
inconsistent measures," with respect to trade sanctions, it is dif-
148 Id. at art. 2.4.
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ficult to examine the rationale as to why the XX(b) exception
would apply.
As indicated above, if a broader interpretation were ap-
plied, sanctions imposed under the Biosafety Protocol to protect
human, animal, or plant life easily would meet the exception.
Especially when considering that LMOs largely impact food
products consumed by humans and animals and are grown in
genetically engineered plants. The "necessary" element should
be satisfied if any such products from LMOs are found to signifi-
cantly endanger any of these living species.
Despite the unpredictability of Article XX(b), the Biosafety
Protocol would most likely fit under the Article XX(g) exception,
provided the species being negatively impacted constitutes an
"exhaustible resource" and the trade measures are "related to"
the conservation of that particular resource. 149 Plants, animals,
and humans together comprise the ecosystem that is at risk of
endangerment from LMOs. The ecosystem is an exhaustible re-
source in the truest sense. Once one "resource" is exhausted, all
the others may be negatively impacted.
As an illustration, if a genetically altered plant species is
released into the environment, it would intermingle with other
plant species, thus tainting them with its genetically manipu-
lated traits. If, over time, the altered genetics impairs a normal
function of any of the plant species by not allowing it to perform
its function in the ecosystem, other plants and animals who eat
the plants or the insects that feed off the plants, and the
humans who eat the animals, all could experience damage.
Given the GATT Panel's inclination to apply a broader interpre-
tation under Article XX(g), along with the potential large-scale
impact of LMOs on biodiversity, trade measures limiting the
importation of LMOs, or at least requiring labeling of such
products derived from LMOs, are definitely "related to" the ex-
haustible resources.
According to the provisions of the Biosafety Protocol, all
provisions must be applied domestically, as well as abroad, in
an evenhanded fashion. Therefore, provided such trade mea-
sures are implemented in conjunction with restrictions on do-
mestic production or consumption, as is required by the
149 See Protocol, supra note 2, at art. XX(g).
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Biosafety Protocol, the Article XX(g) exception should be satis-
fied. Based upon the decisions of its Panel, the WTO does not
inherently conflict with the Biosafety Protocol and the two can
coexist. Although this analysis focuses solely on the Biosafety
Protocol and the WTO, it also should serve as a guide in ad-
dressing similar disputes and addressing similar issues within
the overall trade and environment debate.
IV. CONCLUSION
The language of the Biosafety Protocol likely meets an envi-
ronmental exception under GATT 1994 Article XX and there-
fore is compatible with WTO principles. This conclusion,
however, is by no means a certainty. Good policy should be con-
sistent and predictable. Each faction of countries already has
begun to interpret the language to their own liking.
To support the consistency and effectiveness of the Bi-
osafety Protocol, the following questions must be answered: (1)
Are PPMs included under the Biosafety Protocol?; (2) What are
the rights and limitations of non-Parties and of Parties that
trade with non-Parties?; and (3) What course of action should be
taken when the provisions of the Biosafety Protocol conflict
with other international agreements? These are extremely dif-
ficult questions to answer. Moreover, no answer will satisfy the
interests of every country. However, without any clarification,
the Biosafety Protocol may prove meaningless. Parties and
non-Parties alike will follow their respective interpretations un-
til a dispute arises. If the matter is trade-related and brought
before the GATT Panel, the Party with the environmental con-
cern may have a chance at success, depending on the relevant
facts of the case. That Party, however, likely will remain at a
disadvantage, while the other party merely "preaches to the
choir."
If it is made clear, internationally, that unilateral trade
measures will not be tolerated, but that multilateral trade mea-
sures are able to qualify under one of the GATT exceptions,
countries may be encouraged to refrain from the use of unilat-
eral trade measures and become members of significant MEAs.
This development will make both implementation of trade
agreements and environmental agreements more efficient and
effective: Despite the non-binding decisions and the reports
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from the GATT Panels, the international community has yet to
adequately define the relationship between MEAs, such as the
Biosafety Protocol, that may provide for trade sanctions, and
the requirements of trade agreements under the WTO. It is
still unclear whether WTO rules could be used to challenge cer-
tain provisions of the Biosafety Protocol. Considering the GATT
Panel decisions discussed above and the likelihood of a chal-
lenge by the United States, the international community may
soon be forced to fully and definitively address the difficult
question of which treaty prevails or, alternatively, how the
WTO and the Biosafety Protocol can coexist.

